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Previous work on the formation and stability of cartels has focused on the case of 
identical players. This assumption is very restrictive in many economic environments. 
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Under optimal sharing the grand coalition is the unique stable cartel if spillovers are 
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goods game with heterogeneous players. My results show – in contrast to earlier 
findings for identical players – that large coalitions may well be stable. 
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1 Introduction 
Recent work on the formation and stability of coalitions has focused on the partition function 
approach. A partition function is a generalisation of the characteristic function of a coalition 
formation game introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). The characteristic 
function assigns a payoff to each coalition which is independent of the actions taken by non-
members. In many economic environments this assumption is too restrictive. The partition 
function approach, first introduced by Thrall and Lucas (1963), relaxes this assumption. The 
coalition payoff may depend on the entire coalition structure. This allows to consider 
spillovers, that is, the formation of a coalition affects the payoffs of non-members. Because 
coalition payoffs are insufficient to identify (Nash) equilibria of coalition formation games, 
Bloch (1996), Yi (1997), and Ray and Vohra (1999) have introduced a per-member partition 
function. Findings have been surveyed by Bloch (2003) and Yi (2003). The move from 
coalition payoffs to individual payoffs requires the use of a sharing rule. In their coalition 
formation models Bloch (1996), Yi (1997) and Ray and Vohra (1999) assume identical 
players and equal sharing of coalition payoffs. In this paper I relax this symmetry assumption. 
In a more general setting, with differences in players' characteristics, equal sharing is less 
convincing. I introduce an alternative sharing rule and apply it to a cartel formation game. 
The sharing rule suggested here distributes the coalition payoff proportional to outside-option 
payoffs. It can be shown that if a coalition is internally stable under some sharing rule, then it 
is internally stable under the suggested rule.1 I will refer to this rule as "optimal sharing". 
Optimal sharing will guarantee internal stability whenever it is at all feasible. 
The approach in this paper is more general than the existing literature because it relaxes the 
identical players assumption. The generality with respect to players' characteristics comes at 
some cost. I consider only cartel formation games in which it is assumed that at most one non-
trivial coalition might form. The analysis focuses on internal and external stability of cartels. 
A cartel is stable when no member has an incentive to leave and no non-member has an 
incentive to join. 
Two main results are obtained. Both results require a superadditive payoff function. In other 
words, a coalition can achieve at least as much as its members can achieve individually. First, 
I consider the case of negative spillovers where non-members lose when others form a 
coalition. I prove that the grand coalition is the unique stable cartel under optimal sharing. 
Second, for the case of positive spillovers where non-members gain when others form a 
coalition, I show that the set of stable cartels can be generated by a simple algorithm, 
provided the payoff function satisfies a "non-essential player" property. A player is non-
essential in an internally stable coalition if the remaining coalition without that player is 
internally stable. The intuition behind my result is that every stable coalition can be "built up" 
                                                 
1
 Internal stability means that no coalition member has an incentive to leave. 
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stepwise by a sequence of internally stable enlargements starting from a small internally 
stable coalition. If the non-essential player property does not hold, that is, if all players of a 
coalition are essential, then this coalition cannot be built up by a sequence of internally stable 
enlargements. In such case the set of stable cartels is almost unrestricted.  
A cartel formation game with positive spillovers has first been introduced by d'Aspremont et. 
al. (1983). It has more recently received much attention in the study of international 
environmental agreements. These have been studied, for instance, by Barrett (1994) and Hoel 
and Schneider (1997). The applicability of cartel formation games, however, has so far been 
hampered by the restrictive assumption of identical players. In a cartel formation game a 
player's strategy set consists of the options whether or not to become a coalition member. The 
payoffs of all players (not only coalition members' payoffs) depend on the coalition formed. 
There are spillovers to non-members. A typical situation where such game structure arises is 
the provision of public goods. It is well-known from the literature on private provision of 
public goods that – due to free-riding – inefficiently low levels of public goods are provided, 
since players do not take others' benefits into account. The inefficiency problem may be 
mitigated to some extent if we allow for coalition formation. Barrett (1994, p. 891) concludes 
from the analysis of a symmetric cartel game that self-enforcing agreements (coalitions) "may 
not be able to improve substantially upon the non-cooperative outcome." An additional 
finding in this paper is that Barrett's result does not generalise to cases where players differ 
with respect to their marginal benefits of the public good. In fact, any coalition can be stable 
if one player's marginal benefit is sufficiently large. 
The next section introduces a cartel formation game. Section 3 introduces the sharing rule and 
shows that it "maximises" stability. Section 4 contains the main results of the paper. The 
characterisation of stable coalitions in cartel formation games with heterogeneous players is a 
major contribution to coalition theory and will stimulate new applied work in, for instance, 
industrial economics, environmental economics, and public choice. Section 5 provides an 
application. I show for a simple public goods game with non-identical players that it has the 
non-essential player property and, hence, the set of stable cartels is easy to compute. Section 6 
concludes.  
2 The cartel game 
Let N be a finite set of players. Players are denoted by i, j and so on. Each player j chooses a 
strategy {0,1}jσ ∈ . If player j chooses 1jσ = , she will be a member of a (unique) coalition; if 
she chooses 0jσ = , she will not be a member. Let C N⊆  be the set of coalition members. 
Suppose i C∈ , then iC−  is the shorthand notation for coalition \{ }C i , i.e. the remaining 
coalition when i "leaves". Similarly, jC+  is the shorthand for { };C j j C∪ ∉ . ( )i Cpi  is the 
payoff of player i under coalition C. ( )i iC−pi  is i's outside option payoff which I will also call 
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her claim. For convenience, I assume that ( ) 0j Cpi ≥  for all j N∈  and all C N⊆ . 
Furthermore, I assume that for all ,i j N∈ , ({ }) ( )j jipi = pi ∅ . If only a single player announces 
"1", the (trivial) coalition formed is not effective. 
It is obvious that the sharing rule applied to distribute the coalition payoff will affect the 
stability of a coalition, that is, the incentives to join or stay out. Individual payoffs of 
members of coalition C are derived from the joint coalition payoff ( )Cpi  by applying a 
sharing rule. A sharing rule   distributes the coalition payoff. It assigns a payoff ipi  to each 
coalition member i. Formally, for every coalition 2NC ∈  and every sharing rule 
: 2 CN →  , ( ) ( )i i CC ∈= pi  and ( ) ( )i
i C
C C
∈
pi = pi .  
We now define the concepts of internal and external stability. The condition for internal 
stability is that each coalition member gets at least as much as she gets when leaving the 
coalition, while others stay on. External stability means that no player outside the coalition 
would gain by joining the coalition. Denote the set of internally stable coalitions by S , and 
the set of externally stable coalitions by S

. Formally: 
DEFINITION 1 (internal stability): C S∈   if and only if for all i C∈  it holds that  
 ( ) ( )i i iC C−pi ≥ pi . (1) 
DEFINITION 2 (external stability): C S∈   if and only if for all \j N C∈  it holds that 
 ( ) ( )j j jC C+pi > pi .2 (2) 
Coalition C is called a stable coalition if and only if it is internally and externally stable. The 
set of stable coalitions is denoted by S. 
DEFINITION 3 (stability): C S∈  if and only if C S S∈ ∩  . 
Clearly, if (1) and (2) hold, we have a Nash equilibrium of the cartel formation game as no 
player has an incentive to deviate from her chosen strategy. The set of stable coalitions S is a 
subset of all Nash equilibria. The full set is obtained if we weaken the stability definition and 
replace the strict inequality sign in (2) by a weak inequality sign. In the remainder of the 
paper I will use the stronger stability notion of definitions 1-3. 
                                                 
2
 The tie-breaking rule is here that a player would join the coalition if she is indifferent between joining and 
staying out. Hence, by this definition, the empty set ∅  is not externally stable, and a trivial coalition is 
internally stable. 
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3 Optimal sharing rules 
Consider the following class of sharing rules o  where each coalition member receives her 
outside option payoff ( )i iC−pi  and the residual ( ) ( )i i
i C
C C
−
∈
pi − pi  is shared in an arbitrary 
way. Formally this class of sharing rules is charcterised by the following condition.  
Weak Equal Treatment Condition: For all i C∈  and all C N⊆ , ( ) ( )i i iC C−pi ≥ pi  if 
and only if ( ) ( )i i
i C
C C
−
∈
pi ≥ pi .  
Of all possible sharing rules the Weak Equal Treatment Condition selects the class of surplus 
sharing rules where outside option payoffs define an “original position”.3  
A particular sharing rule belonging to the class o  is sharing proportional to outside option 
payoffs, * . For all i C∈  
 ( ) ( ) ( )i i iC C C−pi = α pi , (3) 
where ( )( ) ( )i i
i C
CC
C
−
∈
pi
α =
pi
. 
The results that follow in the remainder of the paper are derived for * , but they hold for 
every rule in o  as the incentives to join or leave a coalition do not depend on the 
distribution of the residual ( ) ( )i i i
i C
C C
−
∈
pi − pi .4 
It can be shown that *  produces the largest possible set of internally stable coalitions. 
THEOREM 1  In a cartel formation game, if coalition C is not internally stable under 
sharing rule * , then C is not internally stable under any rule.  
Proof: Internal stability requires by definition that for all i C∈ , ( ) ( )i i iC C−pi ≥ pi . It follows 
that the coalition must earn at least the sum of the outside option payments 
 ( ) ( )i i i
i C i C
C C
−
∈ ∈
pi ≥ pi  . (4) 
If (4) holds, then 1α ≥  and 
 ( )Cpi = ( ) ( ) ( )i i i i
i C i C
C C C
− −
∈ ∈
α pi ≥ pi  . 
                                                 
3
 The Weak Equal Treatment Condition is usually violated in applied studies on coalition stability. Cf. e.g. 
Weikard et al. (2004) and the references cited therein. 
4
 Note that *  is the equal sharing rule for identical players. 
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According to * , for all i C∈ , ( ) ( ) ( )i i iC C C−pi = α pi . If C is unstable under * , then there 
exists i C∈  such that ( ) ( )i i iC C−pi < pi ( ) ( ) ( )i i i iC C C− −⇔ α pi < pi . Hence, ( ) 1Cα < , and the 
coalition payoff is less than the sum of the outside option payments. This violates the 
necessary condition for internal stability (4). Therefore, there cannot exist a sharing rule 
under which C is internally stable if C is internally unstable under * . QED. 
Theorem 1 says that if C is stable under some sharing rule, then C is stable under * . This 
allows us to focus further analysis of coalition stability on rule *  and still be sure that no 
internally stable coalition escapes our attention. Other possible sharing rules need not be 
considered because no rule can generate an internally stable coalition that is not also 
internally stable under * . 
The following Lemma sheds light on the relationship between coalitions C and jC+ . 
LEMMA 1  In a cartel formation game, under sharing rule * , coalition C is 
externally unstable if and only if, there exists \j N C∈  such that jC+  is internally 
stable.  
Proof: Suppose C is externally unstable, then there exists \j N C∈  such that 
( ) ( )j j jC C+pi ≤ pi . Note now that ( )j Cpi  is j's outside option payoff with respect to coalition 
jC+ . Under 
*
 , if ( ) ( )j j jC C+pi ≥ pi  holds for j , then ( ) ( )i j i j iC C+ + −pi ≥ pi  for all { }i C j∈ ∪ . 
Every member of the enlarged coalition { }C j∪  receives at least her outside option payoff 
and, hence, the enlarged coalition is internally stable. QED. 
Lemma 1 implies that every coalition C is either externally stable or there exists an enlarged 
coalition jC+  which is internally stable. This characteristic will be helpful for identifying the 
set of stable coalitions. 
4 Cartel stability 
For what follows I impose restrictions on the payoffs. First, payoffs are required to be 
superadditive. A coalition C joined by an additional member j can achieve at least as much as 
C and j can achieve independently.  
DEFINITION 4 (superadditivity): Payoffs are superadditive if and only if for all 
coalitions C N⊂  and all \j N C∈ , it holds that ( ) ( ) ( )j jC C C+pi ≥ pi + pi . 
Superadditivity is a natural assumption as all options open to a set of individual players 
should be open to a team. The following holds: 
LEMMA 2  In a cartel formation game, under sharing rule * , if payoffs are 
superadditive, then every two-player coalition is internally stable.  
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Proof: Consider { }C i= . It follows from superadditivity that ({ , }) ({ }) ({ })ji j i ipi ≥ pi + pi . 
Since, for all i, ({ }) ({ }) ( )i ii jpi = pi = pi ∅ , the superadditivity property can be rewritten as 
({ , }) ({ }) ({ })i ji j j ipi ≥ pi + pi . This says that the coalition payoff is at least as much as the sum 
of the outside option payoffs. Hence, under *  every player receives at least her outside 
option payoff and, hence, all two-player coalitions are internally stable. QED. 
In what follows I call jC+ , where \j N C∈ , an internally stable enlargement of C if both, C 
and jC+ , are internally stable. 
THEOREM 2  A non-trivial ( 2C ≥ ) stable coalition always exists in a cartel 
formation game, under sharing rule * , if payoffs are superadditive. 
Proof: The proof is by contradiction. Suppose no non-trivial stable coalition exists. By 
Lemma 2 all two-player coalitions C are internally stable. By assumption they are unstable. 
Hence, they must be externally unstable. Then, by Lemma 1, there exists an internally stable 
enlargement jC+ . Again, by assumption jC+  is not stable and, hence, not externally stable. 
Then, Lemma 1 applies again, and so on. Then there must be a sequence of internally stable 
enlargements. If an enlarged internally stable coalition reaches size N, there cannot be a 
further enlargement. Hence, a stable coalition C must exist such that 2 C N≤ ≤ . QED. 
The next restriction I impose concerns spillovers. I will examine two cases: negative 
spillovers and positive spillovers. With negative spillovers non-members lose as the coalition 
grows. In this case the grand coalition (C N= ) is stable. Note that under superadditivity, the 
grand coalition is always efficient. In the case of positive spillovers, non-members gain when 
others join the coalition. Here the issue is more complex. Usually an efficient outcome (the 
grand coalition) cannot be obtained as there are strong free rider incentives. An examples is 
discussed in section 5. The simpler case of negative spillovers is discussed in turn. 
DEFINITION 5 (negative spillovers): Payoffs exhibit negative spillovers if and only if 
for all coalitions C N⊂  and all , \j k N C∈  it holds that ( ) ( )j k jC C+pi < pi . 
The following theorem holds. 
THEOREM 3  In a cartel formation game, under sharing rule * , if payoffs are 
superadditive and exhibit negative spillovers, then the grand coalition is the unique 
stable coalition: { }S N= . 
Proof: The proof is by induction. There are three steps. First, we show that if a coalition C is 
internally stable, then jC+  is also internally stable. 
Step 1: Suppose C is internally stable. Then, under * , everyone receives more than her 
claim, as ( ) ( )i i
i C
C C
−
∈
pi ≥ pi . By superadditivity ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i j j j i j
i C i C
C C C C+ +
∈ ∈
pi + pi ≥ pi +pi  . Then, 
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it also holds that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i j j j i i j
i C i C
C C C C+ + −
∈ ∈
pi + pi ≥ pi +pi  . Note now that the sum of the 
claims of coalition jC+  is ( ) ( )i j i j
i C
C C+ −
∈
pi + pi . By negative spillovers we have 
( ) ( )i j i i i
i C i C
C C+ − −
∈ ∈
pi < pi  . Hence, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i j j j i i j i j i j
i C i C i C
C C C C C C+ + − + −
∈ ∈ ∈
pi + pi ≥ pi +pi > pi +pi   . This establishes that the 
payoff of coalition jC+  is larger than the sum of the claims of the coalition members. We 
conclude that if coalition C is internally stable, then jC+  is internally stable.  
Step 2: By Lemma 2 we know that an internally stable two-player coalition exists. By step 1 
we know that every enlargement of a n-player coalition to an n+1-player coalition generates 
an internally stable coalition. Hence, all coalitions are internally stable. 
Step 3: By Lemma 1, if, there exists \j N C∈  such that { }C j∪  is internally stable, then C is 
externally unstable. Such j always exists unless C is the grand coalition. Hence, the grand 
coalition is the unique stable coalition. QED. 
We now turn to the more interesting case of positive spillovers. Positive spillovers imply that 
there are free rider incentives. Thus, we expect stable coalitions that are smaller than the 
grand coalition, but according to Lemma 2 stable coalitions have at least two members. 
DEFINITION 6 (positive spillovers): Payoffs exhibit positive spillovers, if and only if 
for all coalitions C N⊂  and all , \j k N C∈  it holds that ( ) ( )j k jC C+pi ≥ pi . 
While superadditive payoffs give an incentive to join the coalition, positive spillovers work in 
the opposite direction. A larger coalition does not only achieve more for its members but it 
also generates larger benefits to non-members. These benefits are an obstacle to forming large 
and successful coalitions. Generally, superadditivity and positive spillovers do not limit the 
set of possible stable coalitions. If free rider incentives are very strong, the set of stable 
coalitions may just be the set of two-player coalitions. If, however, only the grand coalition 
achieves a substantial gain while smaller coalitions are largely ineffective, then the grand 
coalition may be in the set of stable coalitions. One constraint on the set of stable coalitions is 
that if C is stable no subset of C of size 1C −  is stable. The following Lemma holds. 
LEMMA 3  In a cartel formation game, under sharing rule * , if C S∈ , then iC S− ∉ .  
Proof: If C S∈ , then by definition of stability C is internally stable. From Lemma 1 we know 
that if C is internally stable then iC−  is not externally stable. Hence, iC S− ∉ . QED. 
Without further restrictions on the payoff structure, there is little more to say. However, we 
can identify a class of cartel formation games for which all stable coalitions can be generated 
in a simple straightforward manner. This class of games is characterised by the fact that not 
all players are essential for the success of the coalition. A player is essential if, without this 
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player, the remaining coalition is internally unstable and would fall apart. I formally define 
the property of non-essentiality. A lemma follows. 
DEFINITION 7 (non-essentiality): Player i C∈  is non-essential for coalition C S∈   if 
and only if iC S− ∈

.  
LEMMA 4  In a cartel formation game with superadditivity, under sharing rule * , if 
every internally stable coalition has a non-essential member, then there exists a 
sequence of internally stable enlargements from 2C =  for every stable coalition. 
Proof: We assume that every internally stable coalition has a non-essential member. Consider 
a stable coalition C of size 2C n= > . As C is stable, it is also internally stable and has a 
non-essential member. Hence, there exists a coalition iC S− ∈

 of size 1n − . As iC S− ∈

, there 
exists i jC S− − ∈

, and so forth until the size of the coalition is 2. This establishes the result. 
QED.  
The existence of a non-essential player rules out payoff structures with specific synergies. 
Consider a large stone that can only be moved by four persons. Any three would not be strong 
enough to do so. In this case, a coalition of four could be stable, while there is no internally 
stable coalition of three. The existence of a non-essential member in every internally stable 
coalition rules out the possibility of stable coalitions of size 1n +  if there does not exist an 
internally stable coalition of size n.  
I call a sequence of internally stable enlargements leading to C "complete" if C can be 
described by a sequence of internally stable enlargements and if there is no \j N C∈  such 
that jC+  is internally stable. I can show now that the set of complete sequences of internally 
stable enlargements coincides with the set of stable coalitions. 
THEOREM 4: In a cartel formation game with superadditivity, under sharing rule * , 
if every internally stable coalition has a non-essential member, then the set of 
complete sequences of internally stable enlargements coincides with the set of stable 
coalitions. 
Proof: First, notice that a complete sequence of internally stable enlargements leads to a 
stable coalition: If C is generated by a sequence of internally stable enlargements, then it is, 
by definition, internally stable. As the sequence is complete there does not exist \j N C∈  
such that jC+  is internally stable. Then, by Lemma 1, C is externally stable and, hence, stable. 
Second, Lemma 4 establishes that every stable coalition can be constructed by a sequence of 
internally stable enlargements. This sequence is in fact a complete sequence, since, by Lemma 
1, there cannot be an internally stable enlargement. Hence, the set of complete sequences of 
internally stable enlargements coincides with the set of stable coalitions. QED. 
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Note that the converse of Theorem 4 is not true. The set of complete sequences of internally 
stable enlargements may coincide with the set of stable coalitions while there exist internally 
stable coalitions consisting of essential members only. 
The importance of Theorem 4 is that it identifies a class of coalition formation games for 
which the set of stable coalitions is easy to compute. It is easy to establish a simple algorithm 
that generates the stable coalitions for the class of cartel formation games with non-essential 
members in every internally stable coalition.  
DEFINITION 8 (simple algorithm): (i) Start with 2n = . (ii) Check each internally 
stable n-player coalition C for internally stable enlargements for all \j N C∈ . If 
there is no internally stable enlargement of C, then the sequence is complete. If there 
is an internally stable enlargement jC+ , put it on a list of internally stable coalitions 
of size 1n + . (iii) If the check is completed, proceed with the listed internally stable 
1n + -player coalitions at step (ii). (iv) Stop when the list of internally stable  
1n + -player coalitions is empty.  
The following holds. 
THEOREM 5  The simple algorithm generates the stable coalitions in a cartel 
formation game with superadditivity, under sharing rule * , if every internally 
stable coalition has a non-essential member. 
Proof: By construction the simple algorithm generates all complete sequences of internally 
stable enlargements. Theorem 4 establishes that the set of complete sequences of internally 
stable enlargements coincides with the set of stable coalitions. QED. 
5 Cartel formation and the provision of public goods 
In this section I show that Theorems 4 and 5 have important applications. I consider the case 
of the provision of public goods when benefits are linear and costs are quadratic. More 
specifically, I consider the two-stage game introduced by d'Aspremont et al. (1983) and 
applied to public goods problems by Barrett (1994), Chander and Tulkens (1995), Carraro and 
Marchiori (2003) and others in more recent years. The important difference is that here I relax 
the identical players assumption usually invoked in the literature and I apply the optimal 
sharing rule developed in this paper. There are N players. At stage 1 each player considers 
whether or not to join a binding agreement. Those who join, coalition C, fully cooperate in the 
provision of the public good at the second stage. They maximise the coalition payoff and 
share the payoff according to * . The remaining players \N C , the free riders, maximise 
their individual payoffs.  
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I show that this game satisfies the condition that there exists a non-essential player for every 
internally stable coalition. Accordingly, all stable coalitions can be computed by the simple 
algorithm. 
Let 0ib ≥  denote individual marginal benefits, 0ia ≥  denotes a cost parameter, and zi 
denotes the amount of public good provided by i. The total amount provided is ii Nz z∈= . 
At stage 2 of the game a free rider k C∉  maximises: 
 
21
2
\{ }
( )k k k k j k k
j N k
C b z b z a z
∈
pi = + − . (5) 
It follows from a free rider's first order condition that 
 
* k
k
k
b
z
a
= . (6) 
The coalition maximises the joint payoff which is then available for distribution, 
 
21
2( ) i k i i
i C k N i C
C b z a z
∈ ∈ ∈
pi = −   . (7) 
From the set of first order conditions we have 
 
*
j
j C
i
i
b
z
a
∈
=

. (8) 
for all i C∈  (Samuelson's rule). 
Given the first order conditions the equilibrium coalition payoff is:  
 
2
1
2( )
kk
k Ck C l
i i
i C j C l C i Cj l i
bb
bC b b
a a a
∈∈
∈ ∈ ∉ ∈
  
  
  pi = + −
 
 
 
 

    . (9) 
When we do not consider redistribution, the term in brackets is the individual net benefit for 
coalition member i. The first addend in the bracket is the benefit from the public good 
provided by coalition members; the second addend gives the benefit from the provision by 
free riders: the third addend is i's cost of optimal provision. 
A coalition C applying *  will be internally stable if and only if the coalition payoff (9) is at 
least as much as the sum of the claims of the coalition members. Recall that player i's claim is 
the payoff i would receive under coalition iC− . Recall also that 
*
  divides the coalition 
payoff proportional to claims. Player i's claim ( i C∈ ) is given by 
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2
1
2( ) i
i
k
k Ci l i
i i i i i
j C l Ci j l i
b
b b bC b b b
a a a a
−
−
∈
−
∈ ∉
pi = + + −

  . (10) 
In order to check for internal stability, we have to compare (9) and the sum of individual 
claims ( )i i
i C
C
−
∈
pi . To simplify notation, let ( ) ( )i i
i C
C C
−
∈
Φ ≡ pi . 
Then, internal stability requires. 
 ( ) ( )C Cpi ≥ Φ . (11) 
First, note that the following holds (see also Barrett's (1994) proposition 2).  
PROPOSITION 1  In a simple public goods game with linear benefits functions and 
quadratic costs functions, if players are identical ( i ja a=  and i jb b=  for all 
,i j N∈ ), then every coalition of size 3 is stable. 
Proof: To show that internal stability is satisfied, we first show that ( ) ( ) 0C Cpi − Φ =  for 
3C = . From (9) and (10) we obtain 
 
2 2
231
2 2
1 1( ) ( ) i ii i i
i C i C i C i C i C i C i Ci i i i
b bC C b b b
a a a a∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
 
pi − Φ = − − + + 
 
       . (12) 
Setting ia a= , ib b= , and 3C = , we obtain from (12) that ( ) ( ) 0C Cpi − Φ = . 
External stability is satisfied for 3C =  for identical players because any 4-player coalition is 
internally unstable. Setting ia a= , ib b= , and 4C = , we obtain from (12) that 
2( ) ( ) 6 / 0C C b api − Φ = − < . QED. 
In order to demonstrate that a public goods game with heterogeneous players has a non-
essential member in every internally stable coalition, one has to show that if C is internally 
stable, then there exists i such that iC−  is internally stable. 
The following proposition holds. 
PROPOSITION 2  In a simple public goods game with linear benefits functions ( 0ib ≥ , 
for all i N∈ ) and quadratic costs functions ( 1ia = , for all i N∈ ), every internally 
stable coalition has a non-essential member. 
Proof: The proof is given in the appendix. 
Theorems 4 and 5 have established how the set of stable coalitions can be determined for any 
numerical specification. 
Another important result follows easily. Barrett (1994) shows that only small coalitions will 
be stable in public goods games. But this result is obtained from a model with identical 
players. If we allow for heterogeneous players, as is the case here, large coalitions may well 
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be stable. It is easy to construct examples with large numbers of players with different 
marginal benefits where the grand coalition is stable.  
PROPOSITION 3  In a simple public goods game with linear benefits functions and 
quadratic costs functions, where marginal benefits ib  and the cost parameter ia are 
given for all \{ }i N j∈ , the grand coalition is stable if player j's marginal benefit is 
sufficiently large. 
Proof: The proof is given in the appendix. 
6 Conclusions 
The study of coalition formation is burdened by the complexity of the strategic situation. In 
order to get a grip on the problem, theoretical models have assumed that players are identical. 
The identical players assumption has so far seriously limited the empirical relevance of 
coalition theory. This paper takes a few steps to overcome some of the difficulties in cartel 
formation games. The optimal sharing rule introduced in this paper guarantees that a coalition 
will in fact be internally stable, whenever it is at all possible to stabilise the coalition. I show 
that, under optimal sharing, the grand coalition is the unique stable cartel in games with 
negative spillovers. Furthermore, I identify a class of games with positive spillovers where 
stable cartels can be easily computed – even for games with many players. Furthermore, I find 
that Barrett's (1994) often quoted result that only small cartels are stable does not hold in a 
generalised class of games with heterogeneous players. 
My results in this paper are important for applied work, for instance, for the study of 
international environmental agreements, trade regulations, R&D cooperation, and the classic 
topic of cartel formation in industries. The relaxation of the identical players assumption will 
give new impulses for further research in these and other areas. 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 2: We prove that every internally stable coalition in a simple public 
goods game with linear benefits functions and quadratic costs functions has a non-essential 
member. We have to show that  
 if C is internally stable, then there exists j C∈  such that jC−  is internally stable. (*) 
Notice first that (*) is satisfied for every C if 3C ≤  (cf. Lemma 2). For the remainder of the 
proof we assume that 4N C≥ ≥ . Suppose C is internally stable. Then, the coalition payoff 
is at least as much as the sum of the claims. Internal stability requires ( ) ( )C Cpi ≥ Φ . Under 
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sharing rule *  every player i C∈  receives ( ) ( )i iC C−α ⋅ pi . Recall that ( ) ( ) / ( )C C Cα ≡ pi Φ  
and C is internally stable if and only if ( ) 1Cα ≥ . We have to show that a non-essential 
member j exists in every internally stable coalition such that ( ) 1jC−α ≥  and, hence,  
 ( ) ( ) 0j jC C− −pi − Φ ≥ . (A1) 
To simplify notation denote n C≡ . Assuming 1ia =  for all i N∈  and internal stability of C 
we obtain from (12) 
 
2
22 2 3( ) ( ) 0
2 2i ii C i C
n nC C b b
∈ ∈
− − 
pi − Φ = − + ≥ 
 
  . (A2) 
This can be rewritten as 
 
2
2 21 2 3 2( 2) 0
2 2 2j j j
j i j i i
i C i C i C
n n nb n b b b b
− − −
∈ ∈ ∈
 
− − −
− − + − ≥  
 
   . (A3) 
Furthermore, (A1) can be written as  
 
2
22 5 0
3j j
i i
i C i C
nb b
n
− −
∈ ∈
 
−
− + ≥  
− 
  . (A4) 
By appropriate manipulation of (A3) we obtain  
 
2
2 2 22 5 1 12 0
3 ( 3)( 2) 2j j j ji i i i j ji C i C i C i C
n nb b b b b b
n n n n
− − − −
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
 
− −
− + − − + ≥  
− − − − 
    . (A5) 
(A5) holds by assumption of internal stability of C. The first two addends of (A5) are 
equivalent to the condition for internal stability of jC− . This is clear from (A4). We denote 
the last three addends of (A5) by  
 
2 21 12( 3)( 2) 2j ji i j ji C i C
nb b b b
n n n
− −
∈ ∈
−Ω ≡ − − +
− − −
  . (A6) 
Then (A5) can be written as  
 0 ( ) ( )j jC C− −≤ pi − Φ + Ω . (A7) 
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To show that (A1) holds, it suffices to show that 0Ω ≤ . It is easy to establish that 0Ω <  for 
0jb = . Furthermore, 0
j
d
db
Ω ≤  in the interval 2[0, )
1 j
i
i C
n b
n
−
∈
−
−
 . Hence, 0Ω <  for  
20
1 j
j i
i C
nb b
n
−
∈
−≤ ≤
−
  
Now, note that we can choose j such that j ib b≤  for all ji C−∈ . Hence, we have 
1
1 j
j i
i C
b b
n
−
∈
≤
−
 . Furthermore, 
1 2
1 1j j
i i
i C i C
nb b
n n
− −
∈ ∈
−
<
− −
   for 4n ≥ . Hence, we can always find 
a player j in C such that 2
1 j
j i
i C
nb b
n
−
∈
−≤
−
 . For this value of bj we have 0Ω < . This establishes 
(A1). QED. 
Proof of Proposition 3: We show that if a player's marginal benefit is sufficiently large, then 
the grand coalition (C N= ) will be stable. By definition the grand coalition is externally 
stable. We only need to check for internal stability. Consider player j. From (12) we obtain 
 
2
2
231
2 2
21
2
2
21
2
1 1( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
.
j j j j j j j
j j j j
j j
i i
i i i
i C i C i C i C i C i C i Ci i i i
i
j j i j
i C i C i C i Ci i i
i i
i C i Cj j
b bC C b b b
a a a a
bb b b b
a a a
b b
a a
− − − − − − −
− − − −
− −
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
∈ ∈
 
pi − Φ = − − + +  
 
+ − +
 
− +  
 
      
   
 
 (A8) 
Inspection of (A8) reveals that ( ) ( ) 0C Cpi − Φ ≥  for sufficiently large bj. QED. 
Remark: In the simple case where 1ia =  for all i N∈ , internal stability of the grand coalition 
is satisfied if and only if   
2
2
2
2
2 ( 2) 2 2 3
1 ( 1) 1 1j j jj i i ii C i C i C
n n n nb b b b
n n n n
− − −
∈ ∈ ∈
  − − − −≥ + + −   
− − − −  
   . (A9) 
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